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I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate law academia has an established story about the trans-
formation of the field—a revolution, in fact—that took place in the 1970s 
and 1980s. According to the traditional narrative, what was once a 
swampy doctrinal backwater became a vibrant hub of intellectual activity 
through the new methodology of law and economics.1 Economic theory 
introduced such concepts as agency costs, the market for corporate con-
trol, and shareholder primacy—concepts that in turn became the domi-
nant framework for the corporate law and theory of today. Some scholars 
have characterized this revolution as the “end of history” of corporate 
law: namely, an international consensus on the corporation’s basic struc-
ture and principles.2 
The consensus on corporate law theory has narrowed the field’s 
doctrinal and methodological foci. Although the vibrancy of shareholder 
primacy has at times been called into question as a matter of law,3 both 
boardrooms and courts have taken the normative call for shareholder 
wealth maximization increasingly to heart. There is little doubt that the 
revolution has not only substantially affected legal theory but also legis-
lation,4 court decisions,5 and corporate behavior.6 It achieved a level of 
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 1. Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342 (2005). 
 2. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 
439, 439 (2001) (arguing that the shareholder-centered model has achieved dominance “among the 
business, government, and legal elites in key commercial jurisdictions”). 
 3. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 284–88 (1998); Lynn 
A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 168–72 (2008). 
 4. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (2011) (limiting the corporate deduction for nonincentive-
based executive pay to $1 million); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 112 (2009) (expressly authorizing 
corporations to provide bylaw provisions that would permit proxy access and to impose any lawful 
condition on the access provision). 
1034 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 35:1033 
success unusual for an academic discipline; it not only transformed the 
field but also the world. 
We now find ourselves in the post-revolutionary period. For some 
academics, it is time to refine the revolutionary principles and attend to 
the subsidiary issues that are left to be worked out.7 But for me, it is time 
to look forward to the next revolution. This Essay argues that corporate 
law academics should look to the economic literature on the theory of the 
firm in taking those next steps. The fundamental question about corpo-
rate law is not how to manage the relationships between shareholders, 
directors, and executives; instead, it is why we have created and sus-
tained corporations in the first place. In going back to basic principles, 
we need to ask ourselves the following question: Why do we have firms, 
rather than markets? And how do corporations serve our needs for firms? 
Can the model be improved? Are there other models to consider? 
Fortunately, we have a robust existing literature seeking to answer 
at least some of these questions. The question of firms versus markets 
was famously posed by Ronald Coase in The Nature of the Firm,8 and 
the economic literature on the theory of the firm has grown (in fits and 
starts) over time to flesh out his work. Although the law and economics 
revolution gave lip service to this literature, in fact, it has largely been 
marginalized.9 It is time to begin incorporating this body of research 
more directly into corporate law, and to start a new revolution that reex-
amines many of the basic principles of the earlier law and economics 
upheaval. 
Part II of this Essay explores the law and economics revolution and 
discusses the different levels of attention to the finance and theory of the 
firm literatures. Part III sets out the basics of the theory of the firm litera-
ture. Part IV discusses how several significant strands of corporate law 
scholarship have already incorporated the theory of the firm literature. 
                                                                                                             
 5. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[W]hile 
the board of directors of a corporation that is a target or potential target of hostile tender offers has 
the power to adopt a poison pill, the particular poison pill it adopts must be reasonably related to the 
goal of shareholder wealth maximization.”); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 
34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound by 
the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards include acting to pro-
mote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”). 
 6. See Matthew T. Bodie, AOL Time Warner and the False God of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. 
CORP. L. 975, 985–89 (2006) (discussing the importance of stock price to the stock options mania of 
the late 1990s). 
 7. Romano, supra note 1, at 355–56 (describing how empirical research based on established 
economic models is now more important than new efforts at modeling). 
 8. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), available at http://on 
linelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x/pdf. 
 9. See, e.g., Michael J. Meurer, Law, Economics, and the Theory of the Firm, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 
727, 732 (2004) (“[T]he theory of the firm has played a minor role in law and economics.”). 
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Finally, Part V explores two potential avenues for inquiry and connection 
moving forward: the role of employees in corporate law, and connections 
with business and organizational theory academics. 
II. THE LOPSIDED LAW AND ECONOMICS REVOLUTION IN 
CORPORATE LAW SCHOLARSHIP 
Sadly, it is unusual for academics to offer stand-alone chronicles of 
the changes within their field.10 Roberta Romano’s After the Revolution 
in Corporate Law,11 on the other hand, takes up this task with zest and 
incisiveness. Her article opens: 
Corporate law is a field that underwent as thorough a revolution in 
the 1980s as can be imagined, in scholarship and practice, method-
ology and organization. The term “revolution” is invoked all too of-
ten in popular culture, but as this article will suggest, it is entirely 
apt in this case. The revolution in corporate law has been so thor-
ough and profound that those working in the field today would have 
considerable difficulty recognizing what it was twenty-five to thirty 
years ago.12 
Much of Romano’s history is familiar rhetorical ground: the “ossified, 
stagnant” state of corporate law in the 1960s;13 the early work of pio-
neers such as Henry Manne14 and Ralph Winter;15 and the wave of law 
and economics scholarship that transformed the field in the 1980s. Ra-
ther than a simple string of successive cites, however, her article seeks to 
single out the specific aspects of the revolution that were critical to its 
success. She identifies three distinct “strands” to this transformation: 
modern finance theory, work on the theory of the firm, and the boom in 
hostile takeovers in the 1980s. The first strand imported concepts such as 
the efficient capital market and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) 
into business law theory and doctrine.16 The second strand introduced 
transaction cost economics and agency costs theory to corporate law, 
building on the earlier work of Berle and Means.17 Finally, the relevance 
                                                 
 10. The exception is the critical legal studies movement, which may have overanalyzed itself 
into dissolution. See, e.g., Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 
1 (1984). 
 11. Romano, supra note 1. 
 12. Id. at 342. 
 13. Id. at 343. 
 14. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 
110 (1965). 
 15. See Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corpora-
tion, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). 
 16. Romano, supra note 1, at 344–46. 
 17. Id. at 347. Berle and Means famously suggested that the modern corporation experienced a 
separation of ownership (shareholders) from control (management) because of, among other things, 
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of these theories was demonstrated in practice when buyouts and other 
novel transaction techniques exploded across the business landscape. 
These three strands—finance, firm, and takeover mania—created the 
new law and economics approach to corporate law and theory. 
Romano goes into significant detail on the role of modern finance 
theory in shaping the transformation. The portfolio theory of investment 
decision-making, irrelevance theories of firm capital structure and valua-
tion, and CAPM provided the intellectual architecture for the notion that 
the corporation represented a somewhat fungible mass of investment sig-
nals.18 And those signals were relatively straightforward to study. Roma-
no notes that finance “differs from many other fields of economics be-
cause it has a decidedly empirical focus.”19 Through event studies, which 
measured the effect of certain “events” on share prices, scholars could 
study the efficiency of state governance statutes, federal legislation, and 
international regulatory regimes.20 Thus, finance brought together a theo-
ry having a relatively straightforward normative agenda—namely, the 
overall maximization of share price—with a methodology for testing re-
sults against that agenda. 
Romano also cites to the importance of the theory of the firm to the 
corporate law revolution but spends considerably less of her discussion 
on it. Romano discusses the advances in the economics of the firm and 
specifies two lines of research in this regard: transaction cost economics 
and agency cost theory.21 Citing to Williamson for the former22 and Jen-
sen and Meckling for the latter,23 Romano argues that these two devel-
opments had a “lasting impact on the thinking of corporate law academ-
ics.”24 She acknowledges that agency costs theory stemmed from Berle 
and Means’s work on the separation of ownership and control, but argues 
that the theory was redeveloped from the corporate finance literature and 
was later “mathematicized and refined by economists.”25 
                                                                                                             
the weakness of the proxy voting system. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE 
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 3–7 (1932). 
 18. Romano, supra note 1, at 344–46. 
 19. Id. at 346. 
 20. See, e.g., Kate Litvak, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Cross-Listing Premium, 105 MICH. L. REV. 
1857 (2007) (studying the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on share prices). 
 21. Romano, supra note 1, at 347. 
 22. Id. (citing OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND 
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975)). 
 23. Romano, supra note 1, at 347 (citing Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of 
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 
(1976)). 
 24. Romano, supra note 1, at 347. 
 25. Id. 
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Although the theory of the firm research is important enough to 
Romano that she lists it as a coequal strand with finance theory, her pro-
gram for the future better demonstrates her actual balance on the two 
subjects.26 She suggests that aspiring corporate law professors would be 
better served by a background in finance than a background in econom-
ics. Graduate economics programs focus more on theory and formal 
modeling, while finance tends to use empirical tools. These empirical 
tools, argues Romano, were more likely to “facilitate the sorting out of 
theories” than would further research based on modeling.27 Noting that 
empirical work depended on a consensus on the ends of a particular poli-
cy or regulatory scheme, she claims that most corporate law scholars 
agreed that the objective of publicly held corporations was to maximize 
the overall wealth of shareholders.28 Given these ends, event studies 
could be employed to determine which policies increased share prices 
and thereby maximized shareholder wealth. 
Finance has indeed become the most important outside discipline in 
the contemporary study of corporate law. Sophisticated number crunch-
ing of stock prices has become a critical—perhaps even the dominant—
analytical tool for today’s corporate law scholar.29 Academics have em-
ployed event studies to address some of the thorniest issues in corporate 
law theory, such as the efficiency of state corporate law,30 staggered 
boards,31 federal securities and state derivative suit litigation,32 independ-
                                                 
 26. Indeed, Romano referred to both when discussing the focus of the law and economics 
reforms. See id. at 348 (“Modern finance and the new economic theories of the firm provided the 
analytical tools for understanding the new deals transforming corporate law practice in the 
1980s . . . .”); id. at 351 (“As takeovers flourished, those deals set the teaching and research agenda, 
and finance and the theory of the firm provided the tools for analyzing the deals and the novel legal 
issues they raised.”); id. (“Modern finance and the theory of the firm offered plausible theories of 
investor and manager behavior and therefore quickly came to be pervasive in analyses of corporate 
law.”). 
 27. Id. at 356. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Prima-
cy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 639 (2006) (citing Randall S. Thomas, The Increasing Role of Empirical 
Research in Corporate Law Scholarship, 92 GEO. L.J. 981, 982–83 (2004)). 
 30. Compare Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 
(2001) (finding that Delaware firms had higher value than firms incorporated elsewhere), with 
Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 46 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32, 57 (2004) (fail-
ing to find higher value). 
 31. See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful 
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887 
(2002). 
 32. Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less in Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 23 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598 (2007); Stephen J. Choi, Motions for Lead Plaintiff in Securities Class Ac-
tions, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (2011). 
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ent directors,33 and executive compensation.34 Legislation such as the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act35 and the Dodd-Frank Act36 has been judged based 
on its grounding (or lack thereof) in empirical research.37 Even the courts 
have gotten into the act; the D.C. Circuit has referred to the empirical 
literature in addressing whether the SEC had demonstrated sufficient 
support for its independent mutual fund chairpersons and proxy-access 
rules.38 
This growing use of empirical study of stock prices in answering 
corporate law’s questions has generated a growing level of criticism. 
First, the efficiency of market prices has been called into question by a 
roller-coaster ride of share prices, particularly the calamitous drop in late 
2008. Market stalwarts such as Alan Greenspan admitted that the models 
for efficient capital markets did not accurately reflect reality.39 Although 
corporate law scholars have emphasized the need to focus on long-term 
shareholder value,40 the reliance on short-term event studies contradicts 
that caution. Second, the notion that share value represents overall socie-
tal efficiency has been questioned not only by progressive scholars but 
                                                 
 33. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and 
Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002). Roberta Romano has criticized the re-
quirements of audit-committee independence within the Sarbanes-Oxley Act based on her review of 
the existing empirical literature. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529–33 (2005). For an overview of this issue, see 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950−2005: Of Share-
holder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1469 (2007). 
 34. For a review of the empirical evidence, see LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY 
WITHOUT PERFORMANCE (2004). 
 35. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of the U.S.C.). 
 36. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 37. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 1779, 1796–1819 (2011) (criticizing Dodd-Frank for lack of empirical support); Romano, 
supra note 33 (criticizing Sarbanes-Oxley for lack of empirical support). 
 38. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1150–51 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding that the SEC 
relied on “insufficient empirical data” in formulating its proxy-access rule and pointing to an analy-
sis of event studies as contrary evidence to the proposed rule); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 
F.3d 133, 142–44 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting the SEC’s dismissal of empirical research on the value of 
independent chairpersons on mutual fund performance). 
 39. Brian Knowlton & Michael M. Grynbaum, Greenspan “Shocked” that Free Markets Are 
Flawed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/23/business/worldbusiness/23 
iht-gspan.4.17206624.html (“I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interests of organizations, 
specifically banks and others, were such as that they were best capable of protecting their own 
shareholders and their equity in the firms.” (quoting former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Green-
span)). 
 40. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 439 (“There is no longer any serious competitor 
to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.”). 
2012] The Post-Revolutionary Period in Corporate Law 1039 
by more mainstream academics as well.41 Proponents of stakeholder the-
ory have jousted with shareholder primacy for some time.42 But the fail-
ures of companies such as Enron and WorldCom, and transactions such 
as the AOL-Time Warner merger, called the shareholder primacy ethos 
into doubt.43 The 2008 financial crisis compounded this doubt. Although 
shareholder primacy is not dead by any stretch, it has suffered a series of 
blows that render it open to serious question. 
Research on the theory of the firm, on the other hand, has been rela-
tively unplumbed in corporate law. Although Romano asserts that the 
economics on the theory of the firm has had “a lasting impact” on corpo-
rate law scholars, it is really only the literature on agency costs analysis 
that has had any substantial development. Certainly, Jensen and 
Meckling’s Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, 
and Ownership Structure shaped much of the subsequent literature on the 
corporation and the roles of shareholders, managers, and directors within 
the corporation.44 Their article developed the nexus-of-contracts theory, 
which argues that the firm is merely a central hub for a series of contrac-
tual relationships. As discussed later in the paper,45 however, this ap-
proach is not a theory of the firm, but rather a theory of agency costs 
within the firm.46 The nexus-of-contracts paradigm isolates corporate 
law, as it “leaves corporate law focused entirely on financial transactions 
that are cut off from the primary strategic operating transactions of the 
corporation.”47 
                                                 
 41. See Fisch, supra note 29, at 638 (challenging “the foundations of using the shareholder 
primacy norm to judge corporate law”). 
 42. See, e.g., LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S NEWEST 
EXPORT (2001) (arguing that the “main problem with American corporations—the main cause of 
their irresponsibility—is their drive to maximize short-term stock prices”). See generally 
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995). 
 43. Bodie, supra note 6. 
 44. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 23, at 308. 
 45. See infra Part IV.A. 
 46. See Thomas McInerney, Theory of the Firm and Corporate Governance, 2004 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 135, 137–38 (“Scholars working in this paradigm do not offer theories of the firm so 
much as theories of who controls the firm.”); Meurer, supra note 9, at 728 (noting “some confusion” 
about the difference between agency theory and the theory of the firm); Edward B. Rock & Michael 
L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1619, 1624–25 (2001) (“Jensen and Meckling, despite the title, did not really offer a 
full-fledged theory of the firm. Rather, they offered a theory of agency costs within firms . . . .”); see 
also Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 
1764 (1989) (“[T]he nexus of contracts approach does less to resolve the questions of what a firm is 
than to shift the terms of the debate. In particular, it leaves open the question of why particular 
‘standard forms’ are chosen. Perhaps more fundamentally, it begs the question of what limits the set 
of activities covered by a ‘standard form.’”). 
 47. Rock & Wachter, supra note 46, at 1629. 
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So there is much left to explore when it comes to the economic the-
ory of the firm. The next section endeavors to sketch (with broad strokes) 
an overview of this literature. 
III. THE THEORY OF THE FIRM IN BRIEF 
The research into the theory of the firm seeks to answer a funda-
mental question: Why do we even have firms at all? The function of 
markets is to allocate resources based on the best information available at 
the time.48 Firms, however, operate outside of this market structure, 
standing like “lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk.”49 The 
law reflects this differentiation, as market transactions are generally gov-
erned by contract, while firms are created as specific business organiza-
tions—partnerships, corporations, LLCs, among others. Why have we 
created the non-market, non-contractual entities in the first place? Why 
not just rely on markets and contracts for everything? 
Early economists did not seek to answer this question, but rather re-
lied on a placeholder to serve their modeling needs. The firm was simply 
a black box that took in inputs and put out outputs. The first modern ef-
fort to inquire into the nature of firms was The Nature of the Firm.50  In 
that article, Coase framed the issue in this manner: 
Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is coor-
dinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market. 
Within a firm these market transactions are eliminated, and in place 
of the complicated market structure with exchange transactions is 
substituted the entrepreneur-coordinator, who directs production. It 
is clear that these are alternative methods of coordinating produc-
tion. Yet, having regard to the fact that, if production is regulated by 
price movements, production could be carried on without any or-
ganization at all, well we might ask, why is there any organiza-
tion?51 
For Coase, the answer is transaction cost economics: organizing produc-
tion through a market creates transaction costs that a firm can avoid.52 
Since the firm consisted of managers and workers, the heart of the firm 
was the relationship between these two groups. It was the firm’s ability 
to manage workers outside of a market that solved significant pricing and 
contracting expenses. As he argued, “it is the fact of direction which is 
                                                 
 48. F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945). 
 49. Coase, supra note 8, at 388 (quoting D. H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 85 
(1930)). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 390–92. 
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the essence of the legal concept of ‘employer and employee’” as well as 
the concept of the firm itself.53 
Although the field started slowly, the theory of the firm made sig-
nificant advancements beginning in the 1970s. Alchian and Demsetz de-
veloped a concept of team production that explained the firm not as a 
way of providing command and control but as a way of pooling disparate 
inputs into a system of cooperative creation.54 They defined team produc-
tion as “production in which 1) several types of resources are used and 2) 
the product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating re-
source.”55 Firms are able to coordinate production among various groups 
without carving the relationships into separable contracts. As a result, 
firms are used when the team method increases productivity, after factor-
ing out the costs associated with monitoring and disciplining the various 
players. Under Alchian and Demsetz’s model, the primary concern of 
team production is making sure that the team members do not shirk their 
responsibilities to the team. The inability to measure individual contribu-
tions to productivity is what makes the firm useful in the first place, but 
it is also the firm’s central governance problem. As a result, an inde-
pendent monitor is necessary to ensure that the team members all con-
tribute appropriately and are rewarded appropriately. That central moni-
tor is the firm itself.56 
Around the same time of Alchain and Demsetz’s work, Oliver Wil-
liamson was continuing to develop Coase’s “transaction-costs” model 
into a robust field of research. Williamson used the theory of the firm to 
identify the types of contractual difficulties that are likely to lead to firm 
governance rather than market solutions.57 When contributions and com-
pensation are harder to value individually, the parties will be left with 
incomplete and ambiguous contracts. And these contracts will be insuffi-
cient to properly allocate economic power within the relationship—
particularly where one or both of the parties must invest significant re-
sources in assets specific to the particular firm, project, or transaction. In 
order to prevent opportunism in the face of these contracts, some system 
of governance is necessary to deal with ex ante developments. Firms can 
provide this governance. By creating legal structures that allocate control 
between the parties separate and apart from their contractual rights, gov-
                                                 
 53. Id. at 404. 
 54. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Or-
ganization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972). 
 55. Id. at 779. 
 56. Id. 
 57. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985); Jeffrey T. 
Macher & Barak D. Richman, Transaction Cost Economics: An Assessment of Empirical Work in 
the Social Sciences, 10 BUS. & POL. 1 (2008). 
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ernments can assist parties in developing relationships that minimize 
transaction costs and facilitate economic growth.58 
The property-rights theory of the firm focuses more particularly on 
the assets that the parties seek to use together. This theory, developed in 
a series of articles by Grossman, Hart, and Moore, posits that firms serve 
as a repository of property rights for assets used in joint production.59 By 
owning the property outright, the firm prevents the tragedy of the com-
mons (in which no one holds property rights over valuable assets) as well 
as the problem of the anticommons (in which property rights are divvied 
up among too many disparate actors). The Grossman-Hart-Moore model 
dictates that the firm should be owned by those who contribute the most 
valuable and most asset-specific property to the joint enterprise. While 
these types of contributors are crucial to the firm’s success, they are also 
the most vulnerable to hold-up problems as the joint enterprise moves 
forward in time.60 
Building on the property-rights theory of the firm, Rajan and 
Zingales have proposed an “access” theory of power within the firm.61 
This model defines a firm “both in terms of unique assets (which may be 
physical or human) and in terms of the people who have access to these 
assets.”62 The power of the individuals within and without the firm is 
based on their relative access to the assets, which Rajan and Zingales 
define as “the ability to use, or work with, a critical resource.”63 Exam-
ples of critical resources include machines, ideas, and people. As Rajan 
and Zingales make clear, “[t]he agent who is given privileged access to 
the resource gets no new residual rights of control. All she gets is the 
opportunity to specialize her human capital to the resource and make 
herself valuable.”64 Combined with her right to leave the firm, access 
                                                 
 58. WILLIAMSON, supra note 22. 
 59. OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 23 (1995); Sanford J. 
Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral 
Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Incomplete Contracts and 
Renegotiation, 56 ECONOMETRICA 755 (1988); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the 
Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1121 (1990). 
 60. In the transaction-cost model, employees may be precisely the vulnerable yet valuable 
contributors to the joint enterprise who have the most to fear from opportunistic behavior. Indeed, 
Blair offers the following critique: “The tendency of the transactions costs literature has been to 
recognize that firm-specific human capital raises similar questions, but then to sidestep the implica-
tions of these questions for corporate governance.” Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital 
and Theories of the Firm, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 66 (Margaret M. Blair & 
Mark J. Roe eds., 1999). 
 61. Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Power in a Theory of the Firm, 113 Q.J. ECON. 387 
(1998). 
 62. Id. at 390. 
 63. Id. at 388. 
 64. Id. 
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gives the employee the ability to “create a critical resource that she con-
trols: her specialized human capital.”65 Control over this critical resource 
is a source of power. Rajan and Zingales argue that “[s]ince the amount 
of surplus that she gets from this power is often more contingent on her 
making the right specific investment than the surplus that comes from 
ownership, access can be a better mechanism to provide incentives than 
ownership.”66 Given the importance of access, the role of the firm is to 
allocate access efficiently among the firm’s agents. 
Other research has focused more specifically on the role of human 
capital. The macroeconomic shift from manufacturing to service and cre-
ative industries led one set of scholars to develop a knowledge-based 
theory of the firm.67 According to the knowledge-based theory, “The way 
the firm develops the knowledge it will use in its production process and 
the extent that firm can bind this knowledge to its structure will influence 
its organizational structure.”68 Rather than emphasize the ownership of 
physical assets—which can be fungible and non-specific—the 
knowledge-based theory focuses on the need to produce, distribute, and 
ultimately retain valuable knowledge-based assets within the firm. Simi-
larly, another approach known as the capability-based theory of the firm 
focuses on firm-specific knowledge and learning that can be translated 
into joint production.69 
These theories of the firm do not lead to the inarguable conclusion 
of shareholder primacy. In fact, they seem to point elsewhere. First, it is 
important to remember that the “firm” means something different than 
corporation. Firms may take one of many different organizational forms: 
corporation, partnership, LLPs, LLCs, cooperatives, and non-profits.70 In 
fact, these legally created organizational forms should look to the theory 
of the firm for justification why they even exist in the first place. But 
given the importance of the corporate form to twentieth-century firms, it 
                                                 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm Struc-
ture: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1123 (2007). 
 68. Id. at 1140. 
 69. McInerney, supra note 46. 
 70. For a discussion of these forms, see HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 
(1996). Organizational forms must justify their existence in a world of contractual obligation. Of the 
organizational forms, partnership comes closest to contract, as it places upon the parties the obliga-
tions they would generally assume from a contractual agreement. Partnership law, however, is an 
effort to shape these relationships by assigning certain rights and duties even in the face of uncertain-
ty about the parties’ intentions. The corporation—with its need for state approval, its particularized 
form, and its limited liability for shareholders—is perhaps the least contractual. See Grant M. Hay-
den & Matthew T. Bodie, The Uncorporation and the Unraveling of the “Nexus of Contracts” Theo-
ry, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1141–42 (2011). 
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would seem appropriate for the theory of the firm to speak to the purpose 
of corporations, as an important subcategory. Coase focuses on the em-
ployer−employee relationship and does not mention shareholders or the 
corporate form. Alchian and Demsetz place the firm at the center of team 
production, with shareholders as one of the many groups providing in-
puts. In fact, Alchian and Demsetz specifically question the very idea of 
shareholder governance: 
In sum, is it the case that the stockholder-investor relationship is 
one emanating from the division of ownership among several peo-
ple, or is it that the collection of investment funds from people of 
various anticipations is the underlying factor? If the latter, why 
should any of them be thought of as the owners in whom voting 
rights, whatever they may signify or however exercisable, should 
reside in order to enhance efficiency? Why voting rights in any of 
the outside, participating investors?71 
The transaction costs and property rights theories do lend themselves to a 
concern for shareholder protection. Both identify vulnerable groups 
among those who provide inputs and attempt to create structures that 
protect them from hold up or exploitation. The transaction-costs school 
has focused on incomplete contracts and the need for firm governance to 
resolve the ex post distributional difficulties. The property-rights school 
has focused on the property at the core of the firm, and those who hold it, 
as the most likely of the groups to need control rights. Both of these ap-
proaches could justify placing shareholders at the center of the firm, in 
order to permit them to gain corresponding economic advantage in the 
face of contractual uncertainty and property-rights weakness. But com-
pelling cases could also be made for employees, suppliers, and customers 
as the parties who—in various types of situations—would be the most 
vulnerable or most in need of protection from other players.72 
The economic literature on the theory of the firm should be attrac-
tive to scholars looking to push into new frontiers in corporate law be-
cause it has the imprimatur of the current corporate law establishment, 
and yet is relatively underexplored. Perhaps more fundamentally, the 
theory of the firm asks foundational questions—primarily, why we have 
legally created firms in the first place. As Jill Fisch has persuasively ar-
gued, empirical scholars who base their studies on share-related value 
“have not yet made the case” that societal efficiency is best reflected in 
                                                 
 71. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 54, at 789 n.14. 
 72. See Blair, supra note 60; see also David G. Yosifon, Consumer Lock-In and the Theory of 
the Firm, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1429 (2012) (arguing for governance rights for customers, based 
on sunk costs and concerns over opportunism). 
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the maximization of shareholder wealth.73 The best opportunity for delv-
ing into these fundamental premises lies with the theory of the firm liter-
ature. 
IV. THE THEORY OF THE FIRM IN CORPORATE LAW 
Many scholars have used the theory of the firm literature in their 
discussions of corporate law, and citations to Coase, Alchian and 
Demsetz, and Williamson are fairly abundant. But three examples of this 
research have developed distinct theories of the firm that have garnered 
substantial traction within the academy: the nexus-of-contracts theory, 
the director primacy theory of Stephen Bainbridge, and the team produc-
tion model of Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout.74 These examples use the 
theory of the firm research in a sustained effort to develop a model of the 
corporation. These three explorations are discussed further below. 
A. Nexus of Contracts 
 The nexus-of-contracts theory has been extremely influential in 
shaping corporate law theory over the past three decades.75 It has driven 
corporate law theorists to emphasize the non-mandatory nature of corpo-
rate law—both as a descriptive and a normative manner—and it has 
counseled against changes to the status quo based on the contractual na-
ture (and arguable Pareto optimality) of that status quo.76 However, as 
                                                 
 73. Fisch, supra note 29, at 640. 
 74. Andrew Gold has used shareholder primacy, director primacy, and team production as 
three examples of theories of the firm in corporate law. Andrew S. Gold, Theories of the Firm and 
Judicial Uncertainty, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1087 (2012). This Essay focuses on nexus of contracts 
rather than shareholder primacy, as that theory is more closely associated with the theory of the firm 
literature. 
This focus on the three theories is not meant to exclude the other insightful works of scholarship 
that have analyzed corporate law using the theory of the firm literature. Many of them have been 
cited already within this Essay. See, e.g., Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 67; McInerney, supra 
note 46; Meurer, supra note 9. While these works constitute the literature upon which I hope schol-
ars will draw more substantially in the future, they have not yet attained the same level of recogni-
tion within the field, nor (in some cases) do they purport to develop a new theory of the corporation. 
I am partial to the employee primacy model of the firm proposed by Brett McDonnell, but I leave it 
for the “future developments” portion of this Essay. See Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or 
Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334, 335 (2008) (“I chal-
lenge shareholder primacy as the appropriate model for corporate law, arguing instead for employee 
primacy in corporate decision-making.”). 
 75. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 1–39 (1991) (discussing the corporate contract); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The 
Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1, 9 (2002) (“The dominant model of 
the corporation in legal scholarship is the so-called nexus of contracts theory.”); Thomas S. Ulen, 
The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics, 18 J. CORP. L. 301, 318–27 (1993) (discussing the im-
portance and impact of the nexus-of-contracts theory). 
 76. Ulen supra note 75, at 322–23 (discussing the overall impact of the theory). 
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noted earlier, the nexus-of-contracts theory is something of an “anti-
theory” of the firm. It explains why firms are not necessary, rather than 
why they exist. Unlike Alchian and Demsetz’s firm—which plays a real 
role in shaping, executing, and enforcing contracts with input provid-
ers—the “nexus” at the center of Jensen & Meckling’s firm is a mere 
legal fiction that is “not an individual” and has no real independent exist-
ence.77 Jensen and Meckling’s model focuses on agency costs created by 
the upper-level managers who are tasked to do the bidding of principals. 
Their theory defines agency costs as the costs associated with monitoring 
by the principal, bonding expenditures by the agent, and the residual 
loss.78 The monitoring they describe looks a lot like the “control” that 
Coase focused on as the key element in defining the firm.79 But Jensen 
and Meckling turn their attention to the relationship between sharehold-
ers (principals) and management (agents), rather than the relationship of 
employees to the firm. Their model joins the financial structure of the 
firm with the management structure of corporate governance. 
As other commentators have pointed out, the nexus of contract the-
ory is thus not really a theory of the firm at all. Rather, it is a theory of 
agency costs within a certain type of firm—namely, the corporation.80 
And upon close examination, it falls apart, at least as a theory of the firm, 
or as a justification for the corporation in the first place. If a corporation 
is really no more than a nexus of contracts, then there should be no need 
for corporations or corporate law. For if firms are not necessary, there is 
no need for the law to create and support them. Recognizing this fact,81 
proponents of the nexus-of-contract theory make two arguments to sal-
vage the theory as both a descriptive matter and a normative prescrip-
                                                 
 77. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 23, at 311. 
 78. Id. at 308. 
 79. And indeed, Jensen and Meckling observe in a footnote: “As it is used in this paper the 
term monitoring includes more than just measuring or observing the behavior of the agent. It in-
cludes efforts on the part of the principal to ‘control’ the behavior of the agent through budget re-
strictions, compensation policies, operating rules etc.” Id. at 308 n.9. 
 80. Hart, supra note 46, at 1763–65; Meuer, supra note 9, at 732; Rock & Wachter, supra note 
46, at 1624; David A. Westbrook, Corporation Law after Enron: The Possibility of a Capitalist 
Reimagination, 92 GEO. L.J. 61, 105 n.277 (2003) (“So for Coase, in the first instance, the firm is 
anything but a nexus of contracts. Instead the firm is a site where the costs of continuous contracting 
(forming a market) outweigh the costs of forming the entity. Ironies abound in the legal academy’s 
appreciation of the great economist.”). 
 81. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 75, at 1417–18, 1444–45 (acknowledging that 
statutory corporate law is necessary to create a corporation); Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law, 
and Science in the Corporate Field: A Critique of Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1530, 1537 (1989) 
(“Admittedly, as a descriptive matter state corporation codes and other sources of law contain many 
mandatory terms that parties cannot contract around . . . . [T]o claim that contractarians would deny 
the existence of coercive legal rules is to accuse them of blindness or stupidity.”). 
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tion.82 First, contractarians argue that the corporation is primarily con-
tractual, and therefore, it represents terms that the parties have freely 
chosen for themselves. Moreover, because the terms have been freely 
chosen, we can presume they are efficient.83 This claim leads to the nor-
mative perspective that because the corporation is merely an intersection 
of voluntary agreements, corporate law should facilitate freedom of con-
tract and eschew mandatory rules.84 But such a norm—taken to its logi-
cal extreme—would eliminate corporate law, at least in terms of any 
mandatory rules. Therefore, some contractarians suggest that corporate 
law should provide default or even mandatory terms in situations when 
the terms are approximations of the will of the parties—or more contro-
versially, where the terms would lead to more efficient results.85 
Thus, the nexus-of-contract theory has taken on a life of its own 
outside of the theory of the firm and has served as both a descriptive 
model and a normative prescription for corporate law scholars. As has 
been repeatedly recognized, however, the nexus-of-contracts approach is 
not a theory of the firm because it “says nothing about why firms exist or 
                                                 
 82. See Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 
31 J. CORP. L. 779, 783 (2006) (“Easterbrook and Fischel’s theory of corporate law is both norma-
tive and positive: that corporate law should take this form; and that it ‘almost always’ does.”). 
 83. A more nuanced version of this would be to have the parties choose their terms is the sys-
tem most likely to lead to an efficient result over time. 
 84. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of 
Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 860 (1997) (“The nexus of con-
tracts model has important implications for a range of corporate law topics, the most obvious of 
which is the debate over the proper role of mandatory legal rules.”); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Fore-
word: The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1397 
(1989) (“[Corporate law contractarians argue] that the contractual view of the corporation implies 
that the parties involved should be totally free to shape their contractual arrangements.”). 
 85. For example, Easterbrook and Fischel argue: 
Thus, the purpose of corporate law is to fill in or even require certain provisions within 
the corporate contract, as long as those provisions are our best guess as to what the par-
ties would have contracted for ex ante, had they the information and foresight to do so. 
Why not just abolish corporate law and let people negotiate whatever contracts they 
please? The short but not entirely satisfactory answer is that corporate law is a set of 
terms available off-the-rack so that participants in corporate ventures can save the cost of 
contracting. There are lots of terms, such as rules for voting, establishing quorums, and so 
on, that almost everyone will want to adopt. Corporate codes and existing judicial deci-
sions supply these terms “for free” to every corporation, enabling the venturers to con-
centrate on matters that are specific to their undertaking. 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1444 
(1989). For a critique of this approach as “inconsistent with the contract theory of the corporation,” 
see Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-
Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 17 (1990) (contending that “it is one thing to propound a de-
fault rule to cover situations not covered in the parties’ contract, and another thing to state a general 
rule applicable irrespective of contract”). 
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what kind of activity is undertaken by a certain firm.”86 Ultimately, other 
developments in the theory of the firm literature have more to add when 
it comes to these foundational topics. 
B. Director Primacy 
Stephen Bainbridge has drawn upon the theory of the firm and pub-
lic choice literature in creating his director primacy theory of the corpo-
ration.87 Bainbridge’s model splits the theory of the firm question into 
two components: What are the ends for which the corporation exists, and 
what are the means of achieving those ends?88 For the theory of share-
holder primacy, shareholders represent both the ends and the means of 
governance.89 Bainbridge agrees that the goal of the corporation should 
be shareholder wealth maximization.90 He believes, however, that control 
of the corporation rests not with the shareholders but rather with the 
board of directors who serves as the “Platonic guardian” of the firm.91 
Bainbridge’s theory is thus an amalgam of shareholder primacy and 
nexus-of-contracts theory but with important differences. Rather than 
saying that the firm is itself a nexus of contracts, he argues that the firm 
has a nexus of its contracts, and that the board is that nexus.92 According 
to Bainbridge, the defining characteristic of a firm is “the existence of a 
central decision-maker vested with the power of fiat.”93 Rather than be-
ing participatory democracies, firms provide for hierarchies that can di-
rect the allocation of resources through command.94 Bainbridge bases his 
theory on Coase’s differentiation between markets and firms, as well as 
                                                 
 86. Meurer, supra note 9, at 731–32 (citing Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, 
in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT (Oliver E. Williamson & 
Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991)). 
 87. Bainbridge’s theory was developed over time through a series of articles on the subject. See 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. 
U. L. REV. 547, 573 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy]; see also Bainbridge, supra 
note 75; Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
601 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Voting Rights]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and 
Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Sharehold-
er Disempowerment]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Prelimi-
nary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Primacy in Takeovers]. He 
synthesized his research into a book on the subject. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008). 
 88. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 87, at 547–50. 
 89. Id. at 573 (“[S]hareholder primacy embraces two principles: (1) the shareholder wealth 
maximization norm . . . and (2) the principle of ultimate shareholder control.”). 
 90. Id. at 563. 
 91. Id. at 550–51, 560 (also referring to the board as a “sui generis body”); Bainbridge, supra 
note 75, at 33. 
 92. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 87, at 554–60. 
 93. Id. at 555. 
 94. Id. 
2012] The Post-Revolutionary Period in Corporate Law 1049 
the notion that “firms arise when it is possible to lower these sets of costs 
inherent to team production by delegating to a team member the power to 
direct how the various inputs will be utilized by the firm.”95 Drawing 
upon Arrow’s The Limits of Organization,96 he contrasts consensus-
based decision-making structures with authority-based structures, and 
argues that the corporation fits Arrow’s model of an authority-based sys-
tem.97 The board of directors serves as the ultimate seat of authority—the 
central decision-maker that contracts with all other players and directs 
them within the firm. 
The director primacy theory has both positive and normative com-
ponents.98 As a matter of description, Bainbridge contends that the direc-
tor-centered model of the firm matches both modern corporate practice 
and the structure of most state law (particularly Delaware, the dominant 
model).99 As a normative matter, he argues that director primacy is supe-
rior to shareholder control because shareholders lack the information 
necessary to make informed decisions about the firm, as well as the fi-
nancial interest in obtaining such information.100 According to Bain-
bridge, “Active investor involvement in corporate decision-making 
seems likely to disrupt the very mechanism that makes the widely held 
public corporation practicable: namely, the centralization of essentially 
non-reviewable decision-making authority in the board of directors.”101 
He also argues that shareholder wealth maximization has become the 
dominant norm in business and in law, and that this norm is optimal be-
cause it reflects the hypothetical bargain that the parties would achieve in 
a world without transaction costs.102 The other stakeholders would be 
willing to pay less for control, according to the hypothetical bargain, be-
cause they are better protected by contracts and welfare legislation. As a 
result, shareholders would efficiently bargain to be the sole recipients of 
the residual profits of the firm.103 
                                                 
 95. Id. at 556 (citing to the “Coasean theory of the firm”). 
 96. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION (1974). 
 97. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 87, at 557–58. 
 98. Id. at 591−92; see Charles R. T. O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur and the Theory of the Modern 
Corporation, 31 J. CORP. L. 753, 774 (2006) (describing director primacy as “both a normative and 
predictive theory: Directors should manage and control the corporation; directors do manage and 
control the corporation”). 
 99. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 87, at 568–74. For an extensive discussion of the 
role of director primacy within the law, see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 87, at 105–53. 
 100. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 87, at 202–03, 233–35. Bainbridge also argues that shareholder 
control can lead to rent-seeking by certain shareholders. Id. at 228–32. 
 101. Bainbridge, Shareholder Disempowerment, supra note 87, at 1749. 
 102. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 87, at 577–83. 
 103. Id. 
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Bainbridge uses the theory of the firm literature to establish the ba-
sics of his model (as a combination of contracts and hierarchy) and then 
to defend its particular configuration of authority and purpose. It is argu-
ably a continuation of Coase’s original insight regarding firms, further 
elaborated with the “hypothetical bargain” used in law and economics 
analyses. Ultimately, however, Bainbridge fails to flesh out his theory 
sufficiently to justify the near absolute control he provides to the board. 
He repeatedly relies on Arrow’s contrast between consensus and authori-
ty to resolve any questions of power allocation in favor of stronger au-
thority. This move—characterized by Brett McDonnell as Bainbridge’s 
“Arrowian moment”—is the crux of his model.104 But as McDonnell 
points out, Arrow’s description of the tradeoff between authority and 
accountability does not resolve all policy questions in favor of authori-
ty.105 Ultimately, Arrow’s dichotomy—and by extension, the director 
primacy model—is “not able to tell us whether reform in favor of some-
what more accountability at the expense of some, but far from total, loss 
in authority is a good idea or not.”106 
Bainbridge’s use of Coase, Arrow, and the theory of the firm moves 
the ball significantly when it comes to our conceptions of the modern 
corporation.107 His director primacy theory has been influential in aca-
demic, practitioner, and judicial circles.108 His insightful but limited use 
of theory of the firm principles demonstrates the opportunity for their 
further development in corporate law. 
C. Team Production 
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout drew extensively from the theory of 
the firm literature in developing their team production theory of corpo-
rate law.109 Like nexus-of-contract and director primacy theories, the 
team production model views the firm as a series of relationships be-
                                                 
 104. Brett H. McDonnell, Professor Bainbridge and the Arrowian Moment: A Review of The 
New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 139, 143 (2009). 
 105. Id. at 161. McDonnell considers various arguments for Bainbridge’s allocation of power 
but ultimately finds none of them to solve the dilemma. Id. at 162–85. 
 106. Id. at 143. 
 107. Id. at 142 (noting that Bainbridge’s “extensive reliance” on Arrow is “on its own, a great 
service”). 
 108. See, e.g., In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 367 n.94 (Del. Ch. 2008) 
(citing Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 87, for the proposition that “the law requires and 
encourages director involvement”); Wayne O. Hanewicz, Director Primacy, Omnicare, and the 
Function of Corporate Law, 71 TENN. L. REV. 511, 514 (2004) (“For the most part, director primacy 
is descriptively accurate and offers a compelling normative justification for why the board, and not 
the shareholders or the courts, should be the institution that decides what a corporation does.”). 
 109. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247, 313 (1999). 
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tween various constituencies.110 These relationships result in the joint 
production of goods or services. And, as in director primacy theory, the 
board of directors serves as the ultimate authority when it comes to as-
signing responsibilities, mediating disputes, and divvying up the prof-
its.111 Unlike Bainbridge or shareholder primacy theorists, however, Blair 
and Stout do not argue that shareholder wealth maximization should be 
the goal of the corporation. Instead, the corporation consists of all stake-
holders who are responsible for the business of the enterprise, and the 
directors owe a duty to all of these participants in the corporate enter-
prise.112 According to the model, these stakeholders contribute their re-
sources to the enterprise with the implicit bargain that the enterprise it-
self will fairly apportion the responsibilities and rewards. The board is 
hired by these stakeholders to serve as the apportioning body. The board 
thus serves the stakeholders’ interests as a group, but it must have au-
thority over them in order to carry out its function.113 
Blair and Stout’s team production model draws extensively on the 
theory of the firm literature. Their analysis opens with the question, 
“Why do firms exist?”114 and discusses the principal-agent and property-
rights approaches on its way to developing the team production model.115 
In focusing on the lateral interactions between different stakeholders, 
Blair and Stout draw extensively on the work of Alchian and Demsetz in 
conceptualizing the firm as a method for coordinating production.116 At 
the same time, they criticize that model for taking “a potentially rich sto-
ry about economic gains from horizontal interaction among team mem-
bers and, by reducing the team members to interchangeable parts that 
make no firm-specific investment, reformulat[ing] the team production 
problem as a vertical principal-agent problem.”117 They then move on to 
consider the work of Holmstrom,118 Tirole,119 and Rajan and Zingales120 
in developing their own team production model of corporate law. Their 
model emphasizes that the team in effect hires the board, rather than the 
                                                 
 110. Id. at 254 (stating that the team production approach is “consistent with the ‘nexus of 
contracts’ approach”). 
 111. Id. at 251. 
 112. Id. at 253. 
 113. Id. at 280–81. 
 114. Id. at 257. 
 115. Id. at 257–61; see also id. at 261–65 (developing a “grand-design principal-agent model,” 
which represents the conventional model of the firm). 
 116. Id. at 265 (citing Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 54). 
 117. Id. at 267. 
 118. Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982). 
 119. Jean Tirole, Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations, 2 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 181, 181 (1986). 
 120. Rajan & Zingales, supra note 61. 
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other way around, and that the team members all plan to share in the 
fruits of the joint production. As Blair and Stout describe it, “the public 
corporation is not so much a ‘nexus of contracts’ (explicit or implicit) as 
a ‘nexus of firm-specific investments,’ in which several different groups 
contribute unique and essential resources to the corporate enterprise, and 
who each find it difficult to protect their contribution through explicit 
contracts.”121 The board serves as a group of “mediating hierarchs” who 
manage the relationships of various corporate constituencies.122 
Like Bainbridge, Blair and Stout endeavor for their model to serve 
both descriptive and normative purposes.123 They argue that the team- 
production model better mirrors the law’s approach to the corporation, as 
in practice directors are largely left alone to manage the affairs of the 
corporation.124 Unlike director primacy, however, the team production 
model requires the board to serve all stakeholders, rather than sharehold-
ers alone. They argue that this is both a better description—as, in prac-
tice, boards balance concerns among various constituencies—and a supe-
rior normative approach. The team production model offers incentives 
for all members of the team to participate, and thereby “more accurately 
captures the fundamental contracting problem corporation law attempts 
to resolve.”125 
Blair and Stout’s team production model, rooted in the work of 
Alchian and Demsetz, and Rajan and Zingales, can be seen as the foun-
dational work for a new school of corporate law and economics based on 
the theory of the firm. But as important as this work is, it would be a mis-
take to think that the team production model represents the alpha through 
omega in terms of the contributions that the theory of the firm can make. 
I would prefer to think of it as the alpha. The following Part explores 
where we might be headed. 
V. THE FUTURE OF THE THEORY OF THE FIRM IN CORPORATE LAW 
The theory of the firm is firmly engrained in the corporate law liter-
ature. Now is not the time to shunt it aside in favor of event studies. In-
stead, corporate law scholars should explore additional opportunities to 
delve into this research. Two ideas regarding the potential for further 
exploration are discussed below: the role of employees in corporate law, 
                                                 
 121. Blair & Stout, supra note 109, at 275. 
 122. Id. at 250. 
 123. Id. at 289. 
 124. Id. at 287–319. 
 125. Id. at 328. For a critique of the exclusion of non-shareholder representatives on Blair & 
Stout’s board of directors, see Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and 
the Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2115−16 (2010). 
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and the potential for further connections between legal scholars and in-
terdisciplinary research. 
A. Employees and the Theory of the Firm 
Employees play a central role in the theory of the firm literature. 
Although the neoclassical firm was largely undefined, employees and 
capital assets were considered to be inside the firm, while customers and 
suppliers were outside.126 In The Nature of the Firm, Ronald Coase sin-
gled out the relationship between the firm and its employees as the firm’s 
defining feature.127 The firm-based (as opposed to market-based) transac-
tions described by Coase involve the purchase of labor for a particular 
endeavor or ongoing concern. In explaining these transactions, Coase 
states: “If a workman moves from department Y to department X, he 
does not go because of a change in relative prices, but because he was 
ordered to do so.”128 The firm’s reason for existing outside of the market 
is the relationship between the entrepreneur-coordinator and the employ-
ee. Coase finds empirical support for this conclusion in the law, as he 
argues that “[w]e can best approach the question of what constitutes a 
firm in practice by considering the legal relationship normally called that 
of ‘master and servant’ or ‘employer and employee.’”129 He then quotes 
at length from a treatise concerning the common law “control” test, 
which provides that “[t]he master must have the right to control the serv-
ant’s work, either personally or by another servant or agent.”130 He con-
cludes: “We thus see that it is the fact of direction which is the essence of 
the legal concept of ‘employer and employee,’ just as it was in the eco-
nomic concept which was developed above.”131 
Although the subsequent theory of the firm literature has not been 
as explicitly employee-centric, it has generally concurred regarding the 
importance of employees to the firm. Alchian and Demsetz, for example, 
define the purpose of the firm as team production that is “production in 
which 1) several types of resources are used and 2) the product is not a 
sum of separable outputs of each cooperating resource.”132 Given the dif-
ficulty of measuring individual contributions to productivity in joint pro-
duction, the core problem of the firm is to make sure contributors do not 
shirk their responsibilities to the team. Such concerns obviously apply to 
                                                 
 126. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 46, at 1631. 
 127. Coase, supra note 8, at 387, 403–05. 
 128. Id. at 387. 
 129. Id. at 403. 
 130. Id. at 404. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 54, at 779. 
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employees. In the transaction-costs model, firms are designed to prevent 
or mitigate ex post opportunism by the parties. The value that employees 
contribute to the firm—often described as “human capital”—may be 
transferable, such as education or general skills, or may be specific to the 
firm. To the extent an employee has invested in firm-specific skills, she 
is subject to opportunistic behavior because she has little leverage to get 
the full value of those skills.133 The property-rights model is also con-
cerned with the relationship of employees to the firm. Although the 
property rights discussed in the model are generally nonhuman assets, 
the assets are “the glue that keeps the firm together.”134 Thus, the proper-
ty-rights theory of the firm is designed in part to explain why the firm’s 
employees remain with the firm.135 
Recent scholarship has taken the role of human capital even further. 
Gorga and Halberstam’s knowledge-based theory of the firm is based on 
“[t]he way the firm develops the knowledge it will use in its production 
process and the extent that firm can bind this knowledge to its structure 
will influence its organizational structure.”136 The knowledge-based theo-
ry focuses on the need to produce, distribute, and ultimately retain valua-
ble knowledge-based assets within the firm. The primary generators of 
this knowledge are employees. Similarly, McInerney’s capability-based 
theory of the firm focuses on firm-specific knowledge and learning that 
can be translated into joint production, emphasizing the role of employ-
ees as holders of the firm’s capabilities.137 Rajan and Zingales’s “access” 
model of power within the firm defines a firm “both in terms of unique 
assets (which may be physical or human) and in terms of the people who 
have access to these assets.”138 An employee uses her access to these 
                                                 
 133. As Margaret Blair has pointed out, “The tendency of the transactions costs literature has 
been to recognize that firm-specific human capital raises similar questions, but then to sidestep the 
implications of these questions for corporate governance.” Blair, supra note 60, at 66. 
 134. HART, supra note 59, at 57. 
 135. Hart poses the following hypothetical: if firm 1 acquires firm 2, what is to stop workers at 
former firm 2 from quitting and forming a new entity? 
For firm 1’s acquisition of firm 2 to make any economic sense, there must be some 
source of firm 2 value over and above the workers’ human capital, i.e. some ‘glue’ hold-
ing firm 2’s workers in place. The source of value may consist of as little as a place to 
meet; the firm’s name, reputation, or distribution network; the firm’s files, containing 
important information about its operations or its customers; or a contract that prohibits 
firm 2’s workers from working for competitors or from taking existing clients with them 
when they quit . . . . [W]ithout something holding the firm together, the firm is just a 
phantom. 
Id. But cf. Rajan & Zingales, supra note 61, at 388 (“The property rights view does not consider 
employees part of the firm because, given that employees cannot be owned, there is no sense in 
which they are any different from agents who contract with the firm at arm’s length.”). 
 136. Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 67, at 1140. 
 137. McInerney, supra note 46, at 139. 
 138. Rajan & Zingales, supra note 61, at 390. 
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unique assets to “specialize her human capital to the resource and make 
herself valuable.”139 Rajan and Zingales argue that “[s]ince the amount of 
surplus that she gets from this power is often more contingent on her 
making the right specific investment than the surplus that comes from 
ownership, access can be a better mechanism to provide incentives than 
ownership.”140 The role of the firm is to allocate access efficiently among 
the firm’s agents.141 
The focus of the theory of the firm literature on the firm as a whole, 
and especially its focus on employees within the firm, stands in stark 
contrast to corporate law where employees are nowhere to be found. The 
primary players in corporate law are shareholders, directors, and officers, 
sometimes described as “management”.142 More recently, gatekeepers 
such as accountants, lawyers, and compensation consultants have taken 
on more specific and significant roles in the structure of corporate gov-
ernance. Employees, however, have remained off the corporate law ra-
dar.143 As someone who believes that employees can and should play 
meaningful roles in corporate governance,144 the theory of the firm litera-
ture supports the notion that employees are critical to our definition of 
the firm. Their importance to the firm, and relative unimportance to cor-
porate law, is the source of some dissonance that needs to be addressed. 
B. Making New Connections 
As Romano noted in After the Revolution in Corporate Law, the 
law and economics movement in corporate law produced “one of the 
more interdisciplinary fields of law.”145 Although the interdisciplinary 
study of law has a hoary tradition,146 it is perhaps even more popular than 
ever before.147 The injection of a rigorously produced methodology into 
the formerly staid confines of corporate law is, according to Romano, the 
reason for the field’s transformation. Rather than simply relying on doc-
                                                 
 139. Id. at 388. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 391. 
 142. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 93 (1986). 
 143. Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 283 
(1998). 
 144. See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, Workers, Information, and Corporate Combinations: The 
Case for Nonbinding Employee Referenda in Transformative Transactions, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
871 (2007). 
 145. Romano, supra note 1, at 342. 
 146. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 
1962−1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987). 
 147. See David A. Hollander, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: What Can We Learn from 
Princeton’s Long-Standing Tradition?, 99 LAW LIBR. J. 771, 773 (2007) (“The increasingly interdis-
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trine developed through case law and doctrinal analysis, law and eco-
nomics scholars could apply a new form of analysis that had the support 
of complex theory and empirical findings. It enabled the new breed of 
scholars to speak with authority and, at times, contempt for those unfa-
miliar with the new approach.148 This interdisciplinary approach was the 
key to the revolution. 
At this point in the revolution, however, the interdisciplinary ap-
proach has become somewhat constrained. Romano’s view is that the 
field has become less a “law and economics” collaboration than a law 
and finance one. She counsels prospective business law scholars to pur-
sue a law and finance PhD rather than an economics PhD, because grad-
uate economics programs have focused too much on theory and mathe-
matical modeling. Romano also contends that “there is a consensus on 
ends, as there is among most U.S. corporate law scholars . . . (a consen-
sus that the objective of public, for-profit corporations is to maximize 
shareholder wealth).”149 This constricted view of interdisciplinarity is, in 
fact, evidence that the field is ripe for another transformation. Finance 
continues to contribute significantly to corporate law. But it seems coun-
ter to the original interdisciplinary spirit of the revolution to circumscribe 
corporate law so narrowly. The tunnel vision of the law and finance ap-
proach threatens to return corporate law to the “ossified, stagnant field” 
that law and economics scholars themselves transformed. 
                                                 
 148. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 1, at 343–44 (describing the preexisting doctrinal approach 
as “an ossified, stagnant field” and “intellectual vacuousness”). Fred McChesney used a colonization 
metaphor to describe this strategic advantage for those proficient in law and economics: 
As American history demonstrates, the colonization of one territory by inhabitants of an-
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by force) rights previously held by the colonized. 
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understand the different form of analysis that the use of economic methods entails. More-
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powerful methods of legal analysis. Not surprisingly, many lawyers have objected to the 
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McChesney, supra note 81, at 1530. 
 149. Romano, supra note 1, at 356; see also Fisch, supra note 29, at 639 (noting the “explosion 
of empirical analysis” and finding that “[e]mpirical scholars have embraced the [shareholder] prima-
cy norm”). 
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There is a wealth of new avenues for exploration in law through the 
social sciences.150 But the different social science disciplines—
economics, psychology, sociology, anthropology—are increasingly bor-
rowing from one another and bleeding into each other’s work. This 
should not be surprising, as at root, these disciplines are about examining 
and explaining human behavior. But with the blending will come conflict 
and confusion. Law represents an ideal melting pot for many of these 
concepts.151 Law relies on an understanding of human behavior to devel-
op a legal system that regulates and motivates individuals within a social 
structure. It thus need not cling to and defend a particular social science 
methodology; it can instead select the best approaches and even combine 
insights across disciplines. 
Economics revolutionized the study of corporate law. It is now time 
to continue and extend the revolution. We should branch out beyond fi-
nance to further consider the insights of the theory of the firm. Rather 
than limiting the connections to finance departments, corporate law 
scholars should look to management, strategy, and organization scholars 
located in business schools, as well as in economics and sociology de-
partments. Obviously, these connections have already begun in earnest, 
as the Berle III Symposium demonstrates.152 But Romano’s narrative 
threatens to marginalize this stream of research. The contributions of fi-
nance should not be allowed to overwhelm the continuing advances de-
veloped through the theory of the firm. 
As noted earlier, with interdisciplinary cooperation comes the po-
tential for conflict and confusion. This seems particularly likely when 
working in the theory of the firm, which lacks a degree of the rigorous 
border enforcement that financial economics has maintained. The ecu-
menical quality of the discipline can be a weakness if one is intent on 
creating a coherent approach. Of course, it is also a strength, as it allows 
for a variety of insights from a broad band of scholars. But if the theory 
of the firm is to take root in corporate law beyond its current footholds, 
academics across departments and graduate schools may need to commit 
to stronger methodological assumptions or shared terminologies in order 
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to provide more continuity between projects. In order to convince others 
to wade into new pools of research, it is helpful first to provide some 
common ground. Otherwise, the exercise can seem boundless. One of the 
reasons for the success of law and economics in corporate law is its uni-
form name, as well as its approachable and common concepts such as 
agency costs, nexus of contracts, and shareholder primacy. These ideas 
were complex enough to provide a competitive advantage to insiders, 
while being simple enough to be used by a wide range of academics, 
practitioners, and courts. Legal scholars interested in a theory of the firm 
approach to corporate law may need to address this issue self-
consciously and be careful to coalesce around common terms and con-
cepts, so the literature and discipline may grow more harmoniously and 
efficiently. 
Some of this dialogue is happening, particularly outside of law 
schools. But my hope is that the work on the theory of the firm will be-
come more accessible and commonplace to the average U.S. corporate 
law scholar—beyond Jensen and Meckling. One possibility includes 
closer ties with new institutional economics (NIE).153 As a matter of no-
menclature, I confess to some confusion about the differences between 
new institutional economics, transaction-cost economics, and the theory 
of the firm, as the term “new institutional economics” is attributed to 
Williamson, the progenitor of the transaction-costs theory of the firm.154  
Regardless, the International Society for New Institutional Economics 
(ISNIE) would appear to be a congenial place for corporate law scholars 
to convene with academics working on the theory of the firm at business 
schools and social science departments.155 
It is the potential for interdisciplinary connections that provides 
perhaps the most excitement for corporate law academics contemplating 
the theory of the firm literature. The wealth of scholarship upon which 
the field can draw provides a potent contrast to the narrowness of the 
current corporate law literature, resting as it does primarily on empirical 
financial research. Moreover, in an era where the traditional corporate 
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law has become more federalized, and alternatives to the corporation are 
becoming more popular,156 it makes sense to reexamine the root question 
as the base of our system of corporate law: Why firms? The theory of the 
firm promises the best opportunity to begin this inquiry in earnest. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Berle III Symposium demonstrates the potential for corporate 
law scholars to engage with the theory of the firm on broader and deeper 
levels. My contribution to the conference is simply an extended argu-
ment for this engagement to continue. Empirical research into the effects 
of laws, regulations, and corporate governance practices on stock prices 
offers important insights into corporate law’s financial ramifications. But 
much remains to be mapped in our thinking about the social and legal 
construction of organizations, particularly business organizations. The 
theory of the firm literature offers a terrific base for legal scholars to start 
and extend their explorations. 
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